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Abraham Sesshu Roth 




What are the implications for agency – and in particular, the idea of acting for reasons – if we are 
to take seriously the notion of collective responsibility?  My thesis is that some cases of individuals 
subject to a collective form of responsibility and blame will force us to make sense of how it is that 
an individual can be entitled to collective reasons for action, i.e. entitled to a reason had in the first 
place by a plurality of individuals together rather than any one of them alone.  This entitlement 
makes it possible for the collective reason to be a reason for which one acts, even if one’s 
contribution on its own makes little or no difference in the collective effort.  Although a full 
defense of this entitlement cannot be undertaken here, I will gesture at how this might work by 
suggesting that intentions function to preserve reasons for action. 
 
1. Retrospective responsibility and prospective reason for action 
When is it appropriate to blame someone?  (We could of course consider occasions for praise – 
but I will tend to dwell on the negative.)  Let S be a condition or state of affairs that is a candidate 
occasion for blame. For example, someone nearby just off shore is in distress and drowns.  Am I 
to blame for not rescuing him?  Without attempting an exhaustive account of responsibility, we 
might identify one important condition for responsibility by considering a particular sort of 
excuse to deflect blame.  Specifically, I’m interested in the following schema:  
 
(1)  Do something about it: An agent is not responsible for S if he or she is never in a position 
reasonably to do something about it.   
 
If one is to do something about S, and this requires one to j, then one thing we can say is:   
 
(2) Capacity: An agent is not responsible for S if he or she is never able to j.2   
 
A farmer, for example, is not responsible for the loss of her crops if in conditions of sudden and 
unforeseeable extreme drought she is unable to irrigate her fields.  And I am not responsible for 
saving the drowning individual if I cannot swim, or am not trained, or there is no life-ring to toss, 
etc. 
 
1 Some material in this paper benefited from presentation to audiences in the philosophy departments at Davidson 
College, Ohio State University, Bowling Green University, and at the ENSO conference in Lund, Sweden.  Thanks 
also to the editors for their comments.   
2 We might wonder why someone is unable to j. Presumably we should add that the incapacity was non-culpable.  
This suggests that spelling out conditions for this sort of excuse will not yield a reductive account of responsibility, for 
the concept of non-culpability presupposes that of responsibility.  
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Even if this much is clear, our schema is likely to prompt a number of questions, and it 
will not be helpful for someone without some day-to-day familiarity with the notion of blame and 
responsibility.  The schema for example won’t inform us of what exactly counts as reasonable 
when it comes to doing something about S; how much sacrifice would it be reasonable to make in 
one’s efforts?  There is also the worry about the vagueness of the notion of doing something about.  
Presumably, to do something about some problematic S would be to act in such a way as to 
prevent S, or to ameliorate its effects.  Or at least to act in such a way as to have some chance of 
doing these things.  We are not given in (1) anything that says what sort of likelihood of success is 
needed, or the extent of amelioration, for one to count as doing something about S.   
Though the schema leaves much unanswered, it does draw a connection between the 
largely retrospective notions of responsibility and blame on the one hand, and the more 
prospective notion of reason for action on the other.3  At least, it does this so long as we maintain 
(I think quite plausibly) that to do something about S is to act for S-related reasons – such as 
avoiding or preventing S, or ameliorating the badness of S.  Taking j-ing again to be such a 
doing, the schema would be  
 
(3) Look-back-look-ahead:  An agent is not responsible for S if she is never in a position 
reasonably to j for the S-related reasons.   
 
Note that blamelessness with regard to S doesn’t necessarily require that the agent j for those S-
related considerations.  One might j for other reasons; but so long as j is performed, the 
problematic consequences are averted and no blame is called for.4,5  Still, I suggest that the 
possibility or capacity at some point of acting for S-related reasons seems to be relevant for 
responsibility:  blame in the matter of S entails some capacity on the part of the agent to act for 
or in light of those considerations.6  
Why think so?  I take (3) as a plausible understanding of the uncontroversial thought in (1) 
that one cannot be blamed for S if one simply can’t do anything about it.  It is, of course, a part 
of the idea of being in a position to do something about S that one have the ability in (2) simply 
to perform the requisite j-ing.  But beyond this, one must have some capacity to j for the relevant 
reasons – even if, as just noted, the j-ing one in fact does is not done for those reasons.  What is it, 
after all, to be in a position to do something about S but to have the occasion to act in light of the S-
related reasons?  Without such a capacity one would not be able to perform the relevant j 
appropriately; one’s j-ing would be haphazard with respect to the S-related considerations.  If 
that’s the case, then this is not really to be in a position to do something about S; one wouldn’t be 
responsible in this matter.  Similarly, if one is incapable of making sense of their j-ing in terms of 
the S-related considerations, to grasp the significance of their j-ing in light of S, then this too puts 
 
3 The importance in the collective context of forward-looking notions of reason, duty, or obligation, has been 
emphasized more recently for example in Isaacs (2014, 40), Wringe (2014, 474-5), Schwenkenbecher (2013, 2), and 
Dietz (2016, 958).  Important earlier discussion includes Parfit 1984, and Jackson 1987.  
4 Although Kant would say that the S-ing has no moral worth.  
5 Sometimes j won’t preclude S.  But if j is really all one could have reasonably expected to do about S, then even if 
S comes about because of bad luck, it seems that one should not be blamed for S.  And I would add that one is not to 
be blamed even if the j-ing one did do was not done to avert S, but for some other reason. 
6 Culpable ignorance might pose a worry.  Due to the ignorance, the agent was never in a position reasonably to do 
something about S.  We might nevertheless want to blame him.   
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in question one’s responsibility for S.7  So it’s not merely the ability to j that is a condition for 
responsibility for S; it’s also the ability to j for S-related considerations.8 
In light of this, let’s work with the idea that the possibility reasonably to act for certain S-
related reasons is a condition for responsibility and the appropriateness of blame (and praise) for 
S.  If the agent has conducted themselves faultlessly; if there simply was no obligation or reason 
with respect to S, then the agent cannot be blamed for it.  Or if there was a reason to act with 
respect to S, but it simply would be unreasonable for the agent to undertake it given other 
demands she faces, then here too it is unclear how they can be blamed for it.9   
Thus, with Look-back-look-ahead, the backward-looking notion of responsibility is connected 
with the forward-looking notion of acting for reasons.  What implications might this have for 
collective responsibility?10  
 
2. Collective responsibility:  against monolithic agency 
Sometimes one is responsible and blamed for something, alongside others.  Consider the 
following case due to Björnsson. 
 
Humiliation: After the last class of the day, a group of high-school kids grabs the classmate 
lowest in the pecking order, successfully preventing him from catching the bus, leaving 
him with a long and humiliating walk home.11   
 
Responsibility and blame here seem to be collective.  The bullies are responsible for the student’s 
humiliating walk.  But how should this be understood?   
One suggestion is to take seriously the idea of the group as itself an individual agent, 
albeit a monolithic one comprising a number of lesser individual agents.  The group is something 
that acts for reasons, is responsible for what it does, and is subject to blame.  Applied to the 
example, the bullies constitute an agent, and it is responsible for the kid’s long and humiliating 
walk home.  There is something it can do about this – viz., refrain from grabbing the kid, or stop 
individuals from doing so.  The group could act on considerations related to (preventing) the 
humiliation of someone.  But it doesn’t do so, and thus is to blame.12   
 
7 I am assuming that this is not due to some morally culpable ignorance or insensitivity on his part. 
8 Does this make selfishness an excuse?  The worry, I take it, is that the selfish individual might think they have no 
reason to act in light of S-related considerations if those considerations don’t bear on his own interests.  But this by 
itself doesn’t mean that the individual is incapable of acting for such reasons – unless the selfishness is pathological. 
9 These remarks should be qualified in light of important considerations stemming from phenomena of moral luck 
and agent regret (Nagel 1979; Williams 1981).  See Kutz 2002 for a discussion that is sensitive and accommodating 
to these considerations (perhaps overaccommodating to my taste).  Nelkin (2019) also provides a very helpful 
overview.   
10 Look-back-look-ahead is related to a reasons-responsive picture of moral responsibility.  But it is more minimal as a 
thesis.  First, the suggestion is only intended as a condition on responsibility; not as the makings of a complete 
compatibilist account of responsibility.  Second, reasons-responsiveness is often thought of as involving a 
counterfactual condition (regarding what reasons the agent would be responsive to) that has a bearing on what 
actually prompts the action in question (e.g. McKenna (2013: 154) discussing Fischer & Ravizza (1998)).  But I’m not 
taking a position on what sort of counterfactual reasons-responsiveness has to be true for someone to count as acting 
for a reason.  Indeed, Frankfurt style cases (Frankfurt 1969) suggest that one can act for a reason (arguably even do 
so responsibly) while lacking reasons-responsiveness, as McKenna notes.  It is a substantive question whether one 
could act for a reason even if one lacked a counterfactual sensitivity.   
11 Björnsson, “Shared Responsibility Refined”, delivered at Society for Agency and Responsibility, Pacific APA, 
2017.  See also the firing squad example from Parfit 1984, §26.   
12 Collins (2017, 578) describes such a view, though doesn’t endorse it.   
 4 
Seeing the group as an agent and a locus of responsibility in this way has the benefit of 
ensuring a straightforward version of Look-back-look-ahead – the connection between responsibility 
and reason for action noted above.  The group’s responsibility for the child’s humiliating walk is 
linked to the possibility that it could have done something about it – namely, acted so as to 
prevent this from happening, i.e. for that reason.   
Furthermore, there is the suggestion that it’s only by thinking of the group as an agent that 
we can make sense of the sorts of considerations that matter in important cases of collective 
responsibility – such as our responsibility for large-scale environmental damage.  Averting 
environmental disaster is not something about which any ordinary individual agent normally can 
make a difference.  So it’s not clear that this sort of consideration can count as a reason for an 
ordinary individual.  Only something very big and quite extraordinary will be up for this 
challenge – something in the realm of the monolithic.  At the same time, we might hold an agent 
constraint on reasons:  a consideration is a reason for action only for something that is an agent.13  
If averting some large-scale disaster is a reason for action, it is only a reason for a monolithic 
agent.  If that’s right, and we also want to maintain Look-back-look-ahead, then collective 
responsibility must, in turn, be understood in terms of the reasons of this monolithic agent.  
But invoking monolithic agency has its drawbacks.  First, many find implausible the 
thought that the group itself really is an agent.14  It might be thought an ontological extravagance 
to think of groups as agents, over and above the constituent individuals.  There is the temptation 
to try to understand action ascribed to the group reductively, in terms of the agency of the 
constituent individuals.  Whether or not such a reductive project can succeed, there is a further 
worry that many groups seem not – at least not stably – to satisfy the conditions that are often 
thought necessary for group agency, such as some sort of decision procedure, or an 
executive/authority structure.  Even when a collective is not structured in this way, we might 
nevertheless want to assign collective responsibility.  For example, a collection of passersby might 
be collectively blameworthy if they didn’t get their act together to move heavy debris to aid an 
accident victim.  But on the current proposal, since the passersby do not constitute an agent, 
there is no possibility of acting on a reason, and thus no collective responsibility (Held, 1970).   
Another concern with the monolithic agent view is that it is not clear how we are to 
connect the responsibility of the monolithic agent with that of the constituent individuals, in such 
a way that each of the latter is implicated in what the collective does (Collins 2017: 578-9).  For 
example, one might be employed as a low-level administrator in a gigantic corporation or 
educational institution, with little sense of the actual purpose of the institution.  Such a nine to fiver 
might not share the aims of the collective, and is only involved so as to make a living and maybe 
pay for his children’s education.  And yet, he might be performing actions that are important for 
the functioning of the larger institution. His duties (maybe it involves security, or low-level 
administration, classroom instruction, or publicity) could be executed in ignorance of the real 
purposes of the institution.  Indeed, it might be part of his selection and training that he not be in 
a position to understand the higher-level aspects of the organization and its function. 
This case suggests that there is a sense in which one might be a part of a group in that one 
serves merely as a human resource for the group or organization’s pursuit of its ends, without 
genuinely and wittingly participating in what the group does. I’m not suggesting that individuals 
who play a role in the functioning of some monolithic agency are generally exonerated when it 
 
13 For discussion in favor of the agent condition, see Collins (2017, 584); Lawford-Smith (2015); Isaacs, 2011; 23-70).  
Against:  Schwenkenbecher (2013, 8; 2018, 111); Wringe (2014, 484ff; see his 2010). 
14 But see Copp 2006, Pettit 2003, Rovane 1997, French 1979. 
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comes to the blameworthy actions of the monolith.15  However, the fact that such monolithic 
agency is compatible with constituent individual agents whose tasks are so narrow and 
regimented, and who are so ill equipped to understand what the larger entity is up to, suggests 
that locating an individual as a constituent in some larger agency is not yet to give an account for 
how he or she is subject to a form of collective responsibility and blame. This is to say that for 
cases of collective responsibility that can implicate a constituent individual, we need to secure 
some form of Look-back-look-ahead at the level of the constituent individual.   
Indeed, the worry might be pressed further with the suggestion that the robustness of the 
agency attributed to the monolith or group points toward a dampening of the responsibility of 
the individuals; that is, it might be that robustness of agency at the group level might preclude a 
form of Look-back-look-ahead at the level of the individual.  It is partly the lack of responsibility at 
the individual level that is a central component of Copp’s case for taking seriously the idea that 
some group of individuals is an agent.16   
In general, it seems possible that a group agent might have individuals who are human 
resource components – even components that are vital for its functioning as an agent – which (or 
who) do not figure as intentional or full-blown participants in the group’s action.  Thus, it’s unclear 
what implication we are to draw about the responsibility of constituent individuals from the 
proposition that the group or collective is an agent in its own right.  It could very well be that the 
individuals do not, or even cannot, exercise agency in a way that implicates them with respect to 
whatever it is that the group or monolithic agent might be responsible for.  For all we know, 
when a monolithic individual is responsible for some S, the constituent individuals are 
exonerated with respect to it.  That would be quite the opposite of what we were looking for.  
It would seem advisable for our purposes, then, to set aside monolithic individual agency.  I do 
not mean to suggest that monolithic agency has no role to play in any case of collective 
responsibility.  Sometimes there will be a story about how constituent individuals are implicated 
in what the monolith does.   But in many cases there is no monolith.  And even if there is a 
monolith, an important part of the story of how individuals are implicated is left out.  I think that 
to get a handle on collective responsibility, we need to ensure not merely the constituency of the 
relevant individuals, but the possibility of their participation as well.  To that end, we need to look 
to collective action and shared agency.   
 
3.  Joint action and participation   
A familiar distinction is that between joint action where the group is a structured collective and 
arguably counts as a novel agent (over and above the constituent individual agents), and joint 
action of an unstructured collective where the agents are the individuals and there is no novel 
group agent (Schwenkenbecher 2013: 3; Pettit & Schweikard 2006).  It seems promising that by 
invoking the idea of collective action (joint action in the latter sense), we secure participation by 
constituent individuals in a way that appealing to the notion of a novel, monolithic individual 
agency need not.17   
 
15 For a view that holds that such individuals are not exonerated, see Kutz (2000b, 156ff). 
16 Copp (2006, §5).  Copp imagines cases where individuals playing their roles act in morally unproblematic ways, 
and yet because of how their decisions are aggregated, the group behaves in a critcizable way.  And this commits us 
to the group’s responsibility – precisely because there is no responsibility to be assigned to the individuals.  
17 See Schwenkenbecher’s (2018: 117) discussion of Erskine (2014):   
…if there is a duty to rescue the child and the passersby can come together to do so, then they each have an 
obligation to contribute to establishing the kind of group needed for rescuing it…this view requires a certain 
kind of group to be formed – not a group agent but a goal-oriented collective.  Erskine thinks that all that is 
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But recall that we were interested in understanding participation in order to make sense 
of the idea that the individual is in a position to act for the relevant reasons. That is, we need to 
secure Look-back-look-ahead at the level of the individual participant.  It is not yet clear how the 
notion of collective or joint agency is supposed to do this. As it turns out, for some cases it seems 
straightforward how an individual might be in a position to act for the relevant reason, and so the 
case of being held responsible is clear.  Other cases are more challenging and will require us to 
reconsider some assumptions about the nature of agency and acting for reasons.   
First the straightforward cases. Consider an amusing case described by Wringe.   
 
Office: Two people share an office. Due to bad weather the roof starts to collapse. The 
person who needs to be informed has to be informed by email. A has the technical 
expertise necessary to describe the damage to the roof in an informative manner, but 
doesn’t know how to use email. B is a computer wizard who doesn’t know the first thing 
about roofs. Between them, they can pass an informative message to the right person. 
Individually, neither of them can. (Wringe 2014: 479) 
 
A and B are collectively responsible for informing someone of the roof damage, and they can do 
something about it by sending the email with the relevant information.  But at the individual 
level it’s also clear what each can do:  A can compose the message, and B can send it.  Neither 
satisfies something like Capacity (2) with respect to informing the relevant party.  But together they 
do.  And each is capable of performing the actions that would be required for the joint effort.  
But recall that the capacity to perform the relevant action is not enough for responsibility.  
There is, in addition, the question whether one has reason to.  Now, in this case, it seems that 
each participant does have the relevant reason.  The need to inform the relevant party is a reason 
to compose a message in A’s case and serves as a reason for what A does.  Even if A can’t 
accomplish the entirety of the task by himself (because the message must be sent by email and he 
doesn’t know how to do that), he has a relevant reason for his part (composing the message) and 
thus can do something about the matter.  Barring other considerations, it seems then that A 
satisfies Look-back-look-ahead and can be held responsible (alongside B) in the matter.  Likewise for 
B with regard to sending the message that he himself cannot compose.18   
But other cases, such as that of over-determination, pose a challenge for understanding 
how an individual can act for the relevant reasons.19  We can get to a problematic case by stipulating 
in the Humiliation scenario that whether or not an individual participates in the bullying makes 
no difference for the humiliating outcome; the others will engage in bullying irrespective of what 
the individual does.  Given that it makes no difference whether one joins in the bullying – that 
refraining or attempting to intervene won’t change the humiliating outcome – it’s not clear how 
one has a reason to do anything to stop the bullying.  The principle is something like this:  
 
 
required of the individuals here is to act jointly.  They need not form a – structured – group agent.  This 
difference is reflected, for example, in the different way in which the coalition of the willing can be held 
responsible:  responsibility ultimately distributes between the members of the group but does not sit at the level 
of the group as such… 
18 Schwenkenbecher (2013: 9, 11), says something similar discussing Held’s case of bystanders lending aid at the 
scene of a car accident, and attributes this view to Collins (2013).  The bystanders have a duty to engage in joint 
action to prevent some assault, and that this duty can hold of each individually. (Held 1970: 479.)     
19 Schwenkenbecher (2013: 17) notes this, but doesn’t address it.  
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Makes no difference: Sometimes a morally significant outcome S results from the 
contribution of multiple individuals, and S would result irrespective of the actions of any 
one of the individuals.  In that case, the individual has no reason in light of S to act one 
way or another.20   
 
If something like this is true, then we lose our grip on a reason that figures as a condition for 
responsibility.  In what sense, then, can one (along with others) be blamed for humiliating the 
child? 
One reaction to the makes no difference worry is to reject Look-back-look-ahead, allowing for 
responsibility and blame, even in the absence of the relevant forward-looking reason to act on.  
Kutz (2002: 563) seems to defend a position like this.  He describes these cases as involving a 
“mediated relation to harm, where injury is brought about through the actions of others…many 
of them are cases where what any one individual does makes no difference; only together do 
individuals cause harm.” He adds that  
 
It’s a familiar fact of our moral and legal practices that we blame, punish and demand 
compensation from complicitous agents even though what they did made no 
difference…The puzzle arises because, if causal contribution is necessary to responsibility, 
then no one is responsible, for no one makes a difference…What complicitous 
responsibility centrally challenges is an appealing, intuitive principle of responsibility, that 
someone can only be responsible for events over which he had control.  (Kutz 2002: 563) 
 
Kutz says that “Once we have an analytical understanding of co-operation, a normative account 
of complicity follows suit….” (2002 563).  On this view, an individual counts as “inclusive” 
author of actions performed by another agent when each has a participatory intention that joins 
them in a single collective endeavor; responsibility tracks this inclusive authorship.21   
Seeing how responsibility tracks authorship is not controversial so long as we’re talking 
about each author really contributing and making a difference.  But what happens when we don’t 
make a difference?  Kutz (2002, 564) insists that the point still holds:  “…in cases of full over-
determination, when no individual really does make a causal difference, blame…may still fairly 
lie.”  
How does this work?  Take Kutz’ case of the picnic. (2000: 154; see Nefsky 2015: 250-1 
for insightful discussion.)  We are setting up a picnic together.  While I go to fetch a cooler from 
the car, you carelessly spread the blanket in such a way as to destroy a flowerbed.  There is 
nothing that I could reasonably have done to make a difference to avoid the consequence; I did 
everything right – in particular, I can’t keep a constant eye on you; you’re not a child and have 
 
20 See Nefsky 2015, also Parfit 1984, Glover 1975.   
21 Collins (2017, 580) objects to Kutz, saying, 
If each of A, . . . , N intends to ‘w together,’ then there are N intentions, each held by a different individual. 
Nothing is implied about any of the individuals having any significant relation to any of the others or their 
intentions, such as a relation of control or influence or emulation between the intentions. So authorship for 
what the others do—if this is understood as implying individual remedial duties for what the others do— 
receives insufficient justification.   
For Kutz, a participatory intention is an instance of the familiar notion of an intention had by an individual.  But he does 
impose conditions on it:  it has a distinctive content, and is had only when individuals in question are strategically 
responsive to each other, mutually open about their interaction, and committed to shared goals (Kutz 2000a: 7).  So 
it’s probably not fair for Collins to say that on Kutz’ view there are no significant relations between the respective 
intentions of the individuals.   
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no record of reckless disregard for landscaping.  And yet, Kutz suggests, I am partly accountable 
for the damage – though much less so than you, of course. Some support for this assessment 
might come from comparing my culpability as a participant in the joint action with that of some 
other picnicker on the other side of the park who had nothing to do with me and my careless 
picnic partner.  That individual on the other side of the park seems not to be at all implicated in 
the damage to the flowerbed, whereas my culpability, though attenuated, is real.  At least, that is 
the intuition.  Thus Kutz concludes:   
 
Whatever the ultimate account of complicitous responsibility…will have to go at least 
partly by way of the participatory intentions of the agents – their will, independent of its 
effect, to join in a collective act that does injury.  For in the absence of any salient 
individual causal contribution, surely it is the co-operation itself that explains 
responsibility.  Implication follows participation.  (Kutz, 2002, 564) 
 
Kutz is making the point that a lack of control need not preclude responsibility; but the point 
would seem to extend to our concern – the idea of acting for reasons that amounts to doing 
something about S.  As one of Bjornsson’s bullies, I am implicated as a participant in the activity.  
But because I can’t make a difference, there is nothing really for me to do about the bullying and 
humiliation; there is no reason for me to act.  
If we accept Kutz’ intuitions about the picnic case, then we do seem to have an instance 
of accountability and responsibility without having the relevant reason grounding it – without, 
that is, the reason that figures in doing something about the matter.  Regarding Parfit’s famous 
case of the harmless torturers, Kutz (2002: 564) says “Parfit himself struggles to accommodate 
consequentialist ethics to a form of responsibility that seems, on its face precisely independent of 
individual consequence.”  For our purposes the moral would seem to be that we don’t need to 
secure Look-back-look-ahead at the individual participant level, so long as we have joint or collective 
agency.   
Now, it may seem that Kutz has identified a way of thinking about responsibility without 
reason for action (assuming that his intuitions about the picnic case are compelling).  But it is 
troubling to concede that for many of the cases where an individual makes no difference whereas 
a collective effort does address the matter, that the individual participant in the collective effort is 
not acting for any relevant reason and so doesn’t count as doing anything about the matter.  On 
contrary, it seems that the individual who is doing her part of some collective effort is very much 
doing something about the matter, and acting for the relevant reason.   
This concern becomes clearer and more pressing when we recognize that the possibility 
that one might not be a part of the collective effort.  For all that Kutz has said so far, it seems that 
when one is not a participant in some collective effort to address some environmental problem, 
one is not accountable for not making an effort.   Kutz might then suggest that in this case one 
should join in such an effort.  But what would be the motivation or reason for doing so?  It can’t 
be the consideration that we would have thought would generate the reason to do something, 
such as averting environmental disaster or preventing the kid’s humiliation as the case may be.  
After all, the worry was that the individual has no such reason in these makes no difference cases 
(Nefsky 2015:261-3).  But if we ask why one might have a reason to join a collective effort, it 
would be precisely the sort of consideration like addressing climate change.  The central reason 
one would have thought one has for participating in a collective effort is undermined.  I may 
have other reasons – like enjoying the company of people who share my concerns and values.  
But it might be more fun to play video games by myself; or maybe the company of other people 
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who are more carefree and oblivious would offer greater prospect of enjoyment. Of course, I may 
care about the environment much more than video games.  But the point is that that concern 
doesn’t seem to translate into a reason for action when one’s contribution doesn’t make a 
difference.   
Thus, even if we set aside the concerns about how to establish joint action, it seems that 
Kutz’ proposal doesn’t get right the reason that one takes oneself as having for doing one’s part 
in the collective activity.  It’s not as if there is no reason that one might try to locate in Kutz’ 
view.  One might, after all, be concerned with accountability and blame.  And if Kutz is right 
that one has accountability in this situation – and indeed there are views where mutual 
accountability is constitutive of joint action (Gilbert 1990, 2009) – then such a concern will 
generate reasons to act.  But, though a possibility, this is not the sort of reason one naturally has 
for doing something in these sorts of cases.  Accountability was not one’s concern; doing 
something to avoid environmental disaster was (Nefsky 2015).   
I suspect that the challenge raised for Kutz’ approach points to the idea that 
accountability is not fundamental; the rightness of the action, or the reasons that make the action 
right are what really matter.22  Look-back-look-ahead connects backward looking responsibility and 
accountability with forward looking reasons for action.  But the important thought underlying 
Look-back-look-ahead is that this isn’t merely a connection or correlation; the forward-looking 
reasons that make the act the right thing to do (partially) explain or ground facts about blame 
and responsibility.  The sort of pure accountability that Kutz has in mind for complicitous 
responsibility is problematically ungrounded.   
That being said, I think that there is something right in Kutz’ invocation of intention.  
This, after all, is what secures the individual participation needed for the individual agent to be 
implicated in collective responsibility.  But we also need the access to reasons for action that 
make sense of what one is doing in participating. 
 
4.  Linking and Transmission  
We are imagining in the makes no difference cases that it’s the individual who doesn’t make a 
difference, so it’s unclear what reason he or she has for doing something about the matter.  
Whereas, the collective might have the wherewithal to get something done, so the makes no 
difference consideration doesn’t speak against the collective having a reason.  It follows that if we 
can make sense of how an individual could act on the collective reason, then we might be able to 
see how an individual is subject to (collective) blame.  That is, we could use a version of Look-back-
look-ahead that connects an individual participant to a collective reason. We’ve seen that this is 
straightforward when the individual’s contribution is necessary or significant for the collective 
outcome.  But what about cases where it makes no (significant) difference what the individual 
does?   
I hope enough now has been said to suggest to motivate making sense of the idea of an 
individual acting on collective reasons in makes no difference cases.  It’s quite another thing, 
however, to show how one can act for collective reasons in makes no difference cases.  Although I 
won’t be able to provide an adequate defense of that claim here, I will gesture towards the view 
that I think has some promise.   
We should note, first, that there must be collective reasons if it’s going to be possible for an 
individual to act on them.  I took their existence for granted earlier, when discussing Wringe’s 
case of the collective (A and B) reporting the damage to the roof.  Wringe introduces the example 
 
22 Again, I’m bracketing complications arising from moral luck.  See note 9 above.   
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as part of his effort to establish that there are collective reasons.23  And some might want to resist 
that there really is a collective reason here, insisting that fundamentally each of A and B has an 
individual reason to contribute to a collective effort that has a good outcome.  And, if that’s the 
case, then all we have to say is that each is individually responsible for making a contribution.  
That might be an acceptable position to take in this case.24  But then it’s not clear what to say 
about other cases like over-determination where a participant doesn’t make a difference and 
where it is harder to make sense of individual responsibility in a way that doesn’t depend on 
collective responsibility.   
For example, take an overdetermination case due to Parfit – that of the firing squad 
(Parfit, 1984), or take Humiliation described above.  The contribution of each member of the 
squad makes no difference for the bad outcome, given what the others do.  So no one has a 
reason not to shoot and, given Look-back-look-ahead, no one is responsible for execution.  But, 
assuming that the execution should not take place, there seems to be reason for the squad not to 
shoot.  It’s not just that it would be nice for the squad not to.  There is a reason for action, albeit 
not one that is to be understood individually, independent of what other individuals have reason 
to do.   
Reflection on such cases and others suggests that we cannot make do simply with 
individual reasons/obligation.  I will be taking for granted that there are collective obligations or 
reasons in what follows.25  
I turn to the normative significance of collective reasons for the individual – specifically, 
the question of whether it’s possible for an individual to act on collective reasons in makes no 
difference cases.  It seems that we would need something like the following:  
 
Linking Principle:  If I am (or could be) acting with others, and we have a collective reason 
to j, I am entitled to our reason for j-ing; and when I do my part in our j-ing, I am acting 
for that collective reason.   
 
A couple of provisos would help to make this principle more compelling, one addressing cases 
where the collective effort is hopeless, and another where one’s contribution would be 
superfluous.  When the situation is hopeless, there is no collective reason to address the 
problematic S because there is simply nothing to be done.  In the example of working against 
environmental disaster, perhaps too much damage has been done, and there aren’t enough of us 
to remedy the situation so that it won’t make a difference even if we all exerted ourselves to the 
utmost.  As for the superfluous:  knowing that enough people have already contributed would 
also preclude one from acting on the collective reason.  Here there is a collective reason, but it 
wouldn’t make sense of one’s efforts since others have already acted on it.26   
There may be other sticking points with the Linking Principle, even when supplemented 
with the provisos concerning the superfluous and the hopeless.  One source of reluctance has to 
do with making sense of an individual’s part or contribution in a collective act in the makes no 
difference cases.  What counts as doing one’s part, given how miniscule one’s contribution is in 
 
23 Wringe (2014, 79) suggests that collective obligations explain the corresponding individual obligations.  
24 Although Schwenkenbecher has her doubts (2018, 114-5) and favors the idea that the individuals are jointly 
obligated.   
25 Another case that has generated substantial discussion is that of Hi-Lo.  See Bacharach 2006, Gold and Sugden 
2007, Hurley 1989.  For useful related discussion sympathetic collective reasons, see Parfit 1984 §26, Jackson 1987, 
Wringe 2014, Dietz 2016, Schwenkenbecher 2018.   
26 See Nefsky 2015 on superfluity, and Björnsson forthcoming for discussion.  
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some very large collective endeavors, or given that it makes no difference whether one performs 
the relevant?  In reply, I should say that I am not attempting to give an account of the 
metaphysics of aggregates; so I concede that I am taking for granted that we can make sense of 
what it would be to contribute to or be a part of some collective effort even in cases of over-
determination or other forms of makes no difference.  So, for example, we can make sense of the idea 
that one is doing one’s part in the collective act of getting someone elected by, say, casting a vote 
(or canvassing, or making a campaign contribution, etc).  Whereas, one is not (at least not in 
normal circumstances) doing one’s part in that collective electoral effort if one is sitting on the 
couch twiddling one’s thumbs or buying beer at the convenience store – even though in the makes 
no difference scenarios these latter acts have as much of a chance of making a difference on the 
electoral outcome as the former.  Still, supposing we take for granted the notion of contribution 
here, we can go on to ask about its normative or moral significance.  The question that is our 
concern, then, is how it is that when one is casting a vote, one’s reason for doing so is to get 
someone elected – even if from some individual perspective it makes no difference whether one 
casts a vote.   
A fundamental issue with the Linking Principle concerns the nature of the practical 
cognition involved in the cases it describes, where one is entitled to collective reasons and can act 
on them, even in the makes no difference circumstances.  That is, even where it seems that the 
justificatory force of the reasons would seem not to be immediately accessible to the individual.  
A promising approach to explaining how this might be possible invokes the reason preserving 
function of intention (Roth 2017).27  Intentions play a role in preserving the reasons that figure in 
deliberation and decision-making, so that when the agent subsequently acts on the intention that 
issues from the decision, the agent acts for the reasons that went into that decision.  For example, 
I might for various reasons decide and thereby intend to go to a party on the weekend.  When it 
comes time to attend, I do not consider whether to attend.  After all, I have already decided to go.  
I don’t have to reconsider the reasons; nothing has come up to warrant revisiting the decision. I 
just straightaway act on the intention and head over (or perhaps think about how to get there, 
not whether to go).  Nevertheless, when I go to the party, the reasons for which I go are the ones 
that went into my original decision and which I didn’t reconsider (or need not have reconsidered) 
at the time of action.   
The proposal is that something like this might apply to the collective case.  Imagine, first, 
that one undertakes to decide whether to act on a collective intention to j.  One would have to 
consider the reasons that support j-ing.  But notice that in the makes no difference cases many of 
relevant reasons are not the individual’s own; only the collective really has those reasons – 
precisely because what the individual would do doesn’t make a difference.  So if the individual 
qua individual must make a decision as to whether to act on a collective intention, she will be 
stymied; she can’t act for the reasons that make best sense of the collective effort.  The point, 
however, is that to think that an individual must decide on whether to act on a collective intention 
is not to appreciate how intentions function in one’s practical thought.  Thus, when it’s time to 
act, one doesn’t consider whether to act; rather, one acts directly on the intention (barring 
defeaters).  And in doing so, one acts for the reasons that went into the decision and intention 
formation in the first place.  So, in applying this idea to the case at hand:  the individual acts 
directly on the collective intention without considering whether to do so, and thus without having 
to consider the reasons.  But in executing the intention, the individual is entitled to and acts for 
 
27 Compare Burge 1993 on how working memory might preserve the warranted status of beliefs throughout an 
episode of reasoning. 
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the reasons that went into the collective decision.  At least, that would be in keeping with the idea 
propounded in the previous paragraph that intention plays a reasons-preserving role.  This would 
secure Look-back-look-ahead at a level that is appropriate for collective responsibility bearing on 
individual participants.   
So, Kutz is right that intention matters, as was suggested earlier.  But it matters not 
because it directly secures accountability/responsibility in a way that circumvents Look-back-look-
ahead.  Intention matters, rather, because it’s a way of showing how Look-back-look-ahead applies in 
this case – by securing entitlement to forward looking reasons that are otherwise not available for 
the individual to act upon. 
The picture is one where what I am doing is just a part of what we’re doing.  In executing 
the collective intention, the relevant reasons for so acting are the collective reasons; one is entitled 
to and relies on the collective reasons.  And what one is doing makes sense in those terms – the 
terms that we had thought were proprietary to the entire collective, and not the individual.   
One’s access to the collective reason is by way of acting directly on the intention.  What 
happens when one considers oneself as an individual agent, acting on one’s own? Then the force 
of the collective reason might be counteracted, and the makes no difference considerations could 
very well have a role to play in this undermining (but see below).  But part of the idea of 
intention, be it collective or diachronic within an individual, is that of a rational stability that can 
resist revision.  Sometimes, a proffered intention should be resisted – such as when the 
deliberation or values that led to it are confused or misguided, or the assumptions that were in 
place are no longer relevant, or conditions of communal trust sufficiently eroded.  But these sorts 
of concerns hold for intentions generally, and are not peculiar to the intentions that serve to 
provide access to collective reasons.   
Again, my remarks here are meant only as a gesture at how we might think about what it 
would be for an individual to act on collective reasons in the makes no difference cases.  A fuller 
account would have to defend further the proposal about intentions playing a reason preserving 
function, not to mention the idea that this sort of reason preservation and entitlement can work 
not only diachronically within an individual, but between collective and individual levels.28  
Also needed is a story about who or what issues the collective intentions for one to act on.  
We can imagine that in the case of structured collectives – institutions etc. – there might be 
conventional procedures by which decisions are made on the basis of collective reasons, and the 
corresponding intentions issued.  But I think that even when there is no structured collective it is 
possible for an individual to form the relevant intention.  The intention would not be (just) for the 
intender to act up, but for a collective.  No doubt there will be externalist conditions on whether 
one succeeds in issuing such an intention.  It might depend, for example, on whether sufficiently 
many others are like-minded so as to take up or issue the intention as well.  Just when it might be 
possible to issue such an intention is something that demands further investigation.   
I want to turn, finally, to an argument that suggests that the collective reason in the makes 
no difference cases, if there is one, cannot be a reason for the individual to act because it has no 
normative force for the individual in the first place. We need to identify where this argument 
goes wrong if we’re to make sense of the idea of an individual acting for a collective reason.  I 
think that the following captures how the argument is supposed to proceed: 
 
 
28 I see the project here as related in interesting ways to certain non-reductive treatments of epistemic warrant in 
cases of testimony. See also the discussion of identification in Anderson (2001, 31ff). 
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1. Suppose that there is a collective reason to j.  E.g. someone’s life will be saved if 
adequate funds are raised from numerous individuals for the purchase of some very 
expensive medication.   
2. The person is saved whether or not some one individual joins the collective effort. In 
particular, it makes no difference whether I am a part of the collective effort.   
3. So, there is no point for my being a part of the collective effort. 
4. Thus, I am not subject to the collective reason.  The collective reason puts no normative 
pressure on me or any particular individual to make a contribution.29     
 
I think that the proper response to the argument is to resist the step from 2 to 3.  That is, from 
the fact that for any individual it makes no difference whether they participate, it does not follow 
that one person in particular – such as I, myself – can be excluded from the collective and not be 
subject to the normative force of the collective reason.  
The diagnosis of what goes wrong with this step of the argument is that it mistakenly 
introduces a distinct, individual element in order to resist a collective line of practical thought.  
Thus, reasoning from one’s own point of view, one might think: there is no point for me to make 
a contribution, since I don’t make a difference; I may as well do something else, like go off and 
have a beer with a friend, or take a pleasant drive in my SUV, etc.  I don’t deny that one’s 
interests (be they egoistic, altruistic or whatever) can come into conflict with some collective goal.  
But the argument was meant to show that there was no normative force to the collective reason 
in the first place, not that there was some distinct point of view from which one might resist the 
normative force of the collective reason.  If we start with the collective reason, then the 
recognition that not everyone will need to make a contribution entails not that I will not have to 
but rather that some individuals or some one of us will not have to.  It takes more than the thought 
that I don’t make a difference to get to the conclusion that I am amongst those who have no 
reason to contribute. 
The thought is that there is a collective reason, and for all that’s been said, it is a reason 
for which I can act by acting directly on the relevant intention.  My earlier objection to Kutz was 
that he wanted to secure responsibility while, in effect, conceding that the responsible agent has 
no reason.  He was thereby ditching Look-back-look-ahead.  I think that Kutz is too concessive to 
the makes no difference worry.  Although the agent doesn’t have the relevant individual reason for 
contributing, I am suggesting that there is a collective reason to which she’s entitled, and for 
which she may act. 
 
 
In this paper I have investigated the Look-back-look-ahead principle that draws a connection 
between responsibility and reasons for action.  If we are to apply this principle to cases of 
collective responsibility in which an individual might be implicated, it would help to make sense 
of the idea of an individual acting for a collective reason.  My very preliminary suggestion as to 
how this might work draws on the thought that intentions might preserve and transmit reasons of 
a collective so that an individual acting on the intention is entitled to the collective reasons and 
acts for those reasons.  The idea is modeled on how intentions function within an individual over 
time.  In acting directly on a previously acquired intention, one acts for the reasons that went 
into so deciding.  If this provides a suitable model for the collective case, then we might be able to 
preserve the connection between responsibility and reasons for action in those collective cases 
 
29 Related arguments are rehearsed by Nefsky (2015: 249) and Dietz (2016: 979). 
 14 
where makes no difference considerations make it hard to see what individual reason one has for 
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